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A Pritner on Recovering 
Attorney's Fees 
by James Kevin Mac Alister 
T
here are few truths that are as 
self-evident in the legal 
community today than the fact 
that legal fees are getting more expensive 
and the law is becoming more 
complicated. A consequence of these 
developments is that not only are 
lawyers charging more for their time, 
but they are having to spend more time 
on individual cases. This in turn, has 
produced a dilemma for most attorneys, 
namely: How do I get paid? 
Payment can be derived from three 
potential sources. The first is the client. 
Understandably, few clients have the 
financial wherewithall to sustain a 
protracted legal battle. The second is the 
contingency fee. This source also has 
some important drawbacks. Of course, 
there is always the possibility of an 
unfavorable verdict. Moreover, if the 
case proves to be more protracted than 
originally anticipated, the actual value 
of time invested by the attorney can 
dwarf the agreed percentage of the 
recovery. The third alternative is to 
recover the fees without having to take a 
percentage of any recovery, from 
someone other than the client. 
This third alternative is clearly the 
most attractive. However, it is also the 
most difficult to accomplish. By clinging 
unflinchingly to the so-called 
"American Rule," the courts have 
steadfastly held that attorney's fees are 
not recoverable in litigation. 1 They can 
never be taxed as costs,2 and, unless 
provided for by contract,3 they are 
seldom awarded as damages. In spite of 
this doctrinal ban on recovering fees as 
damages, a number of exceptions have 
been judicially fashioned in an effort to 
recognize some of the hardships 
imposed by the rule. These exceptions 
are found in various statutes,4 rules of 
procedure,S and common law 
principles.6 
Maryland Rule 1-341 
One of the most widely recognized 
exceptions to the American Rule is 
embodied in new Maryland Rule 1-341. 
Under this rule, attorney's fees are 
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regarded as a sanction to be used against 
parties who litigate for the wrong 
reasons. Although the new rule 
inherited much of its text from its 
predecessor, former Rule 604 b,7 there 
are a number of important differences 
between the two rules that have the 
cumulative effect of expanding the 
availability of the sanction. These 
changes are reflected in the step by step 
procedure for invoking the rule. 
Authority to Award Fees 
The claim for fees must arise in the 
appropriate setting. Under both the new 
and old rules, the fees to be charged 
must be attributable to a case filed in 
court.8 Thus, expenses related to pre-
trial activities, such as negotiating a 
settlement before suit has been filed, are 
not recoverable. 9 Also, since both rules 
confine their applications to civil cases, 
attorney fees cannot be recovered in 
criminal cases. 10 
Where the new rule differs markedly 
from its predecessor is in (he types of 
proceedings in which it can be invoked. 
Since Rule 1-341 is located in Title 1 of 
the rules, it "applies to procedure in all 
courts of this State, except the Orphans' 
CourtS."ll Accordingly, unlike Rule 
604 b which applied only in the circuit 
courts,12 the new rule expands the 
authority to award fees to the State's 
District and appellate courts. 13 
This does not mean, however, that 
one court sitting in review of a lower 
court will be inclined to award fees for 
sins committed in the lower court. In 
other words, to preserve the issue for 
appeal, the moving party should be 
required to request fees in the court 
where the culpable conduct occurred. If 
a party fails to enter such a request, a 
claim for fees that could have been 
recovered there should be deemed 
waived. Moreover, when one court sits 
in review of the decision of another, the 
lower court's findings of fact should 
only be reviewed under the existing 
clearly erroneous standard. As to these 
issues, Rule 1-341 would be no different 
from its predecessor .14 
What could be different under Rule 
1-341 is that the appellate courts could 
award fees for culpable conduct 
committed while the case was pending 
on appea1. 1S Thus, when a party against 
whom attorney's fees have been 
awarded at trial , appeals the award of 
fees and losses, the appellate court can 
add fees attributable to the appeal to the 
fees awarded below. 16 This is something 
that was not possible under Rule 604 
because that rule did not grant appellate 
courts the authority to award fees.17 
Culpable Conduct 
To invoke Rule 1-341, the awarding 
court must make certain findings. First, 
it is required to find as a matter of fact 
"that the conduct of any party in 
maintaining or defending any 
proceeding was in bad faith or without 
substantial justification. "18 This differs 
somewhat from that old rule which 
added "for purposes of delay" to the test 
of proscribed conduct. 19 In actuality, 
this works no change in the law. The 
rule's framers removed the reference to 
delay because they believed that 
unjustifiable dilatory tactics were better 
described as acts of bad faith.20 This 
conclusion was reached because not all 
delaying tactics are indicative of bad 
faith. 21 A request for a continuance to 
prepare a surprise witness, for example, 
is a perfectly legitimate request for delay 
that can be made in good faith. 22 
Identifying other instances of bad 
faith or an absence of substantial 
justification are not always so simple. 
Bad faith is difficult to define. The 
simplest way to describe it is as the 
absence of good faith. In their 
commentary on the new Maryland 
Rules, Linda Richards and Paul 
Niemeyer offer what are probably the 
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most helpful guidelines. 23 They regard 
bad faith as any use of the rules of 
procedure for reasons other than that 
were which they were intended. These 
intended uses, they contend, are spelled 
out in the opening section of the rules. 
There, the rule proclaims that "[ t ]hese 
rules shall be construed to secure 
simplicity in procedure, fairness in 
administration, and elimination of 
unjustifiable expense and delay. "24 
A lack of substantial justification can 
be an equally mysterious concept. The 
simplest way to describe this conduct is 
that it involves taking a position that 
"indisputably has no merit - when any 
reasonable attorney would agree that the 
[tactic or strategy] is totally and 
completely without merit."25 This can 
occur for instance, when a party is 
caught raising a question that has been 
squarely answered in a previous case.26 
Although it is difficult to anticipate how 
the rule applies in other contexts, one 
guideline has emerged: an unsuccessful 
attempt to raise a novel issue of law will 
not invoke the rule. 27 In the words of the 
Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, 
"[a] litigant ought not be penalized for 
innovation or exploration beyond 
existing legal horizons unless such 
exploration is frivolous. "28 
In an apparent recognition of the 
difficulties associated with evaluating 
the purpose and frivolity associated with 
litigation strategies, the state's appellate 
courts have accorded great deference to 
lower court findings. Only when a lower 
courts findings are clearly erroneous will 
it be reversed. 29 
Lastly, unlike its predecessor, Rule 1-
341 does not require a court to award 
fees once it finds bad faith or a lack of 
substantial justification. Rather, by 
substituting the discretionary "may" for 
the mandatory "shall," the rule makers 
have made it clear that the ultimate 
decision to award fees is committed to 
the discretion of the court called upon to 
award the fees. Presumably, these 
exercises of discretion will only be 
reviewable on appeal when there has 
been a clear abuse of discretion.3o 
Person Liable for Fees 
Under former Rule 604 b, the court 
could only award fees against a party.3! 
As a result, it was the client who had to 
bear the brunt of his attorney's 
questionable tactics. In an apparent 
recognition that attorneys are often as 
responsible for culpable tactics as are 
their clients, new Rule 1-341 permits an 
award of fees against either the client or 
the "attorney advising the conduct or 
both of them."32 Since the rule does not 
manifest a preference, it should be 
incumbent upon the awarding court to 
explain why it has chosen to impose the 
sanction upon either the attorney or his 
client. Otherwise, there is no way that 
the reviewing court can examine the 
propriety of this exercise of discretion. 33 
One way to avoid this problem would 
be to hold that fees should 
presumptively be awarded against the 
client, unless the court affirmatively 
finds that the attorney was responsible 
for the improper conduct. This 
approach would be consistent with the 
notion that it is the client, and not the 
attorney, who has the ultimate control 
over the case. It overlooks, however, the 
realities of the attorney client 
relationship. While the client is 
responsible for the major decisions, it is 
the attorney who decides how these 
plans are to be translated into litigation 
strategies. Also, since the presumption 
approach would place the burden of 
shifting blame to the attorney on the 
client, a client who failed to comprehend 
the complexities of the tactics that 
resulted in fees being requested would 
be unable to defend the request without 
consulting separate counsel. 
Procedures for Awarding Fees 
Attorney's fees cannot be awarded in 
a vacuum. They represent a deprivation 
of property, and therefore, due process 
requires that the offending party be 
accorded notice and a hearing.34 At this 
hearing, evidence must be introduced to 
show that Rule 1-341 can and should be 
invoked, the appropriate amount to 
assess and against whom the award 
should be made. 35 In the appellate 
courts, this may prove troubling because 
these courts have no current procedures 
for admitting evidence. When 
calculating the appropriate amount, 
however, the courts are not confined to 
the evidence in the record. Rather, the 
court is allowed to apply its own 
knowledge of the case and to fix its own 
price for the value of the legal services 
rendered.36 
Also, the court can bypass a hearing 
altogether if the person against whom 
the sanction has been invoked fails to 
respond to the motion for fees or to 
request a hearing.37 In such a case, the 
defaulting party waives his due process 
right and the court can proceed on its 
own, provided there is enough 
information before it to make the 
required findings. In a recent case, for 
example, fees were awarded against a 
client without a hearing when the 
moving party prayed an award of fees 
against only the client and the client 
failed to respond. Presumably, if fees 
had been requested from the attorney 
and the client, a hearing would have 
been required to decide which person 
should be assessed the fees. 38 
Collateral Litigation 
Occasionally, an individual's breach 
of duty will cause another to become 
involved in litigation. For example, a 
seller who breaches a covenant to 
convey quiet enjoyment of a parcel of 
land can cause the buyer to become 
embroiled in litigation with one claiming 
superior title.39 When this occurs, the 
courts have permitted attorney's fees to 
be recovered from the breaching party 
for the cost of litigating this claim.4o 
Although this exception has received 
limited treatment by the courts, there 
are a number of elements to the 
exception that could easily confuse even 
the most diligent researcher. 
First, there must be separate actions.4! 
One action where the party seeking to 
recover fees was involved in litigation 
with someone other than the breaching 
party and a second action against .the 
breaching party to recover the fees 
associated with litigating the first suit. 
The court of appeals has taken a very 
literal approach to this component of 
the collateral litigation exception. 42 In an 
older decision, the court held that the 
joinder of the breaching party in the first 
suit precluded an award of fees because 
there was no "separate action."43 Thus 
the court appears to be equating the 
words "separate claim" with "separate 
suit." This unexplained penalty for 
joining all the parties in one action is 
puzzling. If nothing else, it flies in the 
face of the policies favoring the joinder 
of all claims in a single suit."44 This is not 
to imply that fees associated with 
litigating issues against the wrongdoer 
should be recoverable. These issues 
would clearly be governed by the 
American Rule. What is desputed is the 
rationale behind denying fees 
attributable to litigating issues with 
parties other than the breaching party. A 
more recent decision of the court of 
special appeals suggests that the 
"separate action" limitation should be 
read as "other parties."45 Thus, the 
court appears to have embraced the 
more sensible notion that the cost of 
litigating with "others" is recoverable, 
regardless of how many suits are 
involved. 
Second, there must be.a wrongful act 
of the defendant that "has involved the 
plaintiff in litigation with others, or 
placed him in such relation with others 
as make it necessary to incur expenses to 
protect his interest."46 In many of the 
earlier decisions, it appeared as though 
this litigation producing act could only 
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be a breach of contract. 47 More recent 
cases, however, suggest that tortious 
conduct will also provide a basis for 
invoking the collateral litigation 
exception. 48 This does not represent a 
departure from the earlier cases because 
those decisions never expressly limited 
their operation to contract cases. 
Rather, the language used merely called 
for a "wrongful act. "49 
Third, the claimed attorney's fees 
must be "the natural and proximate 
consequence of the injury complained 
of."50 Presumably, this means that fees 
cannot be recovered when the defendant 
can prove that the plaintiff would have 
been sued in the first case, regardless of 
the defendant's wrongful acts. Also, if it 
was the plaintiff who brought the first 
suit, he can only recover fees if he lost 
that proceeding. 51 A victory in the 
previous case, by necessity, indicates 
that the court found that no wrongdoing 
had taken place. Hence, there is no 
wrongful act upon which fees were 
expended. 
Enshrouded in this causation issue is 
the question of good faith. Specifically, 
it must appear as though the plaintiff's 
involvement in the first case was 
necessary and in good faith.52 This issue 
becomes especially important when the 
plaintiff is alleging that he was forced to 
bring the first case to protect a bona fide 
interest. In such cases, it must appear 
that there was some threat or interest 
that warranted resorting to the courts 
for protection. 53 
Additionally, the plaintiff's reason for 
bringing suit is central to deciding 
whether he instituted the first action 
with the proper objective in mind. In 
one case, for example, an ex-wife was 
unsuccessful in her attempt to recover 
the expenses associated with obtaining a 
divorce from her former husband. She 
has sued her husband's former mistress, 
alleging that the need for a divorce had 
been brought on because the mistress 
"had sexual relations with, debauched 
and carnally irreparable damages to her 
marriage which culminated in 
divorce."54 Concluding that the 
collateral litigation exception applies 
only when a party has litigated to 
"preserve" an interest, fees could not be 
recovered because divorce served only 
to "destroy. "55 
Lastly, before fees can be awarded in 
the second suit, the plaintiff must show 
that he called upon the defendant to 
assume the task of litigating the first 
suit. 56 The reason behind imposing this 
requirement is that a party should not be 
called upon to pay the cost of litigating a 
case unless he had the opportunity to 
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direct the litigation.57 Apparently, when 
the defendant had actual notice of the 
previous suit and failed to offer counsel, 
it is unnecessary to show that the 
plaintiff called upon him to litigate. 
Similarly, if the defendant was joined or 
participated in the trial of the first case, 
notice is unnecessary because the 
purpose behind the rule has been 
satisfied. 
Indemnification 
When an indemnity relationship 
exists, and the party entitled to 
indemnification has litigated a matter 
for which the indemnitor will ultimately 
be responsible, attorney's fees are a 
proper element of damages in a 
subsequent suit between the indemnitee 
and the indemnitor.58 At first blush, this 
may appear to be strikingly similar to the 
collateral litigation exception. The 
important distinction, however, is that 
there need be no wrongful act 
committed by the defendant. Rather, 
the exception is premised upon the 
notion that the indemnitee, although 
technically a proper party in the first suit, 
actually litigated the matter on behalf of 
the indemnitor; principles of fairness 
dictate that the indemnitee should be 
allowed to recover the fees it expended 
in an effort to reduce or avoid being held 
liable for a judgment that the indemnitor 
would ultimately have had to pay.59 
By definition, before this exception 
can be invoked, there must be an 
indemnity relationship. This can arise in 
two ways. First, unless an "indemnity 
contract provides otherwise, an 
indemnitee is entitled to recover, as part 
of the damages, reasonable attorney's 
fees."60 Second, under the common law, 
a principal joint tortfeasor whose 
tortious conduct causes another joint 
tortfeasor to be held liable is responsible 
for indemnifying the other. 61 
Closely related to the second method 
of creating an indemnity relationship is 
the concept of in pari delicto. Under this 
rule "as between actual tortfeasors the law 
will not enforce contribution or 
indemnity. "62 The justification for 
recognizing this defense is that "[ i]n 
respect to offenses that involve any 
moral delinquency or turpitude, all 
parties are deemed equally guilty, and 
courts will not inquire into their relative 
guilt."63 Thus, complaints of conduct 
must be more than malum prohibitum or 
constructive fault;64 it must raise to the 
level of an actual knowing participation 
in the wrongdoings. 65 Anything less than 
this will result in the indemnitor having 
to pay the fees associated with the first 
action, in addition to any damage award 
made in that suit. 
Two other important limitations 
apply to limit the scope of the rule. First, 
the exception only applies to fees 
expended litigating on behalf of 
another. 66 Thus, fees associated with 
creating or enforcing the indemnity 
relationship are probably not 
recoverable. What this means is that the 
expense of gaining judicial recognition 
of the indemnity relationship is not 
recoverable. In this regard, the 
indemnity exception parallels the 
collateral litigation exception in that it 
contemplates two litigations: one to 
create the duty to pay fees and another 
to enforce it.67 
Second, the indemnitee must show 
that he litigated the previous case solely 
on behalf of another. 6B In the words of 
the Maryland Court of Appeals, the 
indemnity exception only applies when 
he has defended "solely and exclusively 
the act of another, and is compelled to 
defend no misfeasance of his own."69 At 
first glance, this appears to be an element 
of the joint tortfeasor indemnity rule. By 
definition, if the indemnitee is defending 
himself, and not the interests of the 
indemnitor, the exception should not 
apply. This conclusion, however, does 
not take into account those situations 
where an indemnitee relationship exists, 
even though the indemnitee has 
nevertheless committed a tort. 70 A 
better way to explain the "misfeasance 
of his own" concept would be to regard 
it as a mere application of the rule of in 
pari delicto. 
Once it is determined that an 
enforceable indemnity relationship 
exists, it must appear that a demand to 
defend was served upon the 
indemnitee. 71 Of course, an indemnitor 
who had actual notice or actually 
participated in the prior suit cannot 
defend a claim for fees based on a lack of 
notice.72 
Additionally, it is questionable if an 
indemnitee could recover fees if the 
indemnitor was joined in the first suit 
because those fees were related in part to 
creating the indemnitee relationship.73 
The most appropriate way to resolve 
this dilemma would be to borrow from 
the previous collateral litigation 
discussion74 and hold that only the fees 
associated with litigating with the other 
party should be chargeable to the 
indemnitor. In other words, the 
indemnitee would only be precluded 
from recovering expenses associated 
with joining and litigating with the 
indemnitor. 
Duty to Defend 
Many insurance policies not only 
promise to hold the insured harmless 
against liabilities covered by the policy, 
but they often reserve the right to 
control the course of any litigation 
aimed at fixing such liability. 75 This right 
to control any potential lawsuits in turn 
gives rise to a duty to defend. Borrowing 
in part from the collateral litigation 
exception,76 the courts have resolved 
that fees can be recovered from an 
insurer who unjustifiably breaches this 
duty to defend. 77 The award of fees 
includes the cost of defending the suit 
for which a defense was denied and fees 
associated with bringing a declaratory 
judgment action to establish that the 
insurer has breached its duty.78 Thus, 
while the rule contemplates two suits, 
fees are recoverable for both. This 
represents an important departure from 
the exceptions discussed thus far. 79 
Before any of this can take place, 
however, there must be a duty to defend. 
Ordinarily, it is contained in a policy 
term which expressly and unequivocally 
commits the insurer to supplying a 
defense, regardless of how frivolous the 
claim for which a defense is sought may 
be.80 By including such a clear statement 
of duty, the courts reason, the insurer 
has upgraded ordinary liability coverage 
to include litigation insurance.81 In other 
cases, the duty springs from a clause in 
the policy whereby insurer agrees to pay 
counsel fees for counsel approved by the 
insurer.82 
To invoke this duty, it must appear 
that the claim for which a defense is 
sought falls within the wrongs insured 
against in the policy.83 This involves a 
two-step inquiry. First, the terms of the 
policy itself must be determined.84 
Specifically, the covered and excluded 
occurrences ascertained. Also, since 
anyone covered by the policy may assert 
a duty to defend,85 the persons entitled 
to coverage must be identified. 
Ordinarily, this is done without 
reference to the pending suit, unless the 
construction of the policy term will be 
decided in the tort suit. Second, it must 
appear that the allegations in the 
pending suit "potentially" bring it 
within the coverage extended in the 
policy.86 This means that a defense must 
be supplied when the allegations in the 
plaintiff's complaint fall within the 
policy, regardless of what the insurer 
believes that the proof at trial will 
show.87 
Not all breaches of the duty to defend 
will result in fees being awarded. 
Instead, it must appear that the refusal to 
defend was unjustified. In MAIF v. 
Sparks, 88 for example, the court of 
special appeals held that an insurer was 
able to avoid paying fees because its 
refusal to defend, although in 
contravention of the policy term, was 
justified by the insured's misconduct in 
reporting the claim.89 Since the MAIF 
court offered its insight on the question, 
nothing more has been written about the 
"justification" defense. Presumably, it is 
still good law. 
Lastly, there is a current dispute as to 
how fees should be awarded when some 
of the allegations in the pending suit are 
covered under the policy and others are 
not. Specifically, can the insured recover 
only those fees associated with 
defending the covered claims? In 
Continental Casualty Company v. Ed. of 
Education of Charles County,90 the court 
of appeals answered part of the 
question. Without deciding the duty to 
allocate in cases involving unequivocal 
duties to defend, Maryland's highest 
court determind that there would be a 
duty to allocate, when the duty to 
defend is implied from the terms of the 
policy.91 In such cases, fees could only 
be recovered if they are "reasonably 
related to a covered count" in the 
pending suit.92 It is the insured who 
bears the burden of proving that the 
time spent on a given term is related to a 
covered count.93 This is not to imply, 
however, that time spent working on the 
case as a whole is not recoverable. 
Rather, the opposite is true; "[ s]o long 
as an item of service is related to a 
covered count, it may be apportioned 
wholly to the covered claim."94 
As previously mentioned, the court's 
holding was expressly limited to implied 
duties to defend.95 In dictum, though, 
the court implied that there would be no 
duty to apportion in cases involving the 
conventional unequivocal duty to 
defend the entire suit. 96 This flatly 
contradicts the dictum contained in the 
footnote of a decision of the state's 
intermediate appellate court.97 What 
will become of these conflicting dicta 
remains to be seen. 
Conclusion 
As the foregoing reveals, the road to 
recovering attorney's fees in litigation is 
a treacherous one. This is due in part to 
the Maryland Judiciary's steadfast 
enforcement of the American Rule. It is 
also due to a large number of 
ambiquities built into the law. The 
growing cost and importance of 
attorney's fees, it is hoped, will bring 
about a reappraisal of the American 
Rule. As the cost of vindicating one's 
rights soars, there will be fewer and 
fewer clients who will be able to have 
access to justice. While some maintain 
that a policy which favors liberal 
availability of attorney's fees will have a 
chilling effect,98 it cannot be doubted 
that unaffordable legal representation 
has a similar effect. Also, with the use of 
contingency fees by plaintiffs' counsel, 
the injured party ultimately must forfeit, 
a substantial percentage of his hard 
fought damages to his attorney.99 Can it 
be said that it would be wrong to compel 
the one who injured him, and thereby 
compelled him to litigate, to pay at least 
a portion of the fees? The answer in 
Maryland is that it would be wrong. 
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